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s evidenced perhaps most obviously by Major League Baseball’s 
antitrust exemption, our national pastime has received special 
treatment by the federal judiciary in a myriad of ways.1  Because of 
baseball’s exalted status, federal courts at all levels have frequently 
 
∗ Professor of Legal Writing, Villanova University School of Law. 
1 Interestingly, the case that created the exemption, Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, 
Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), reh’g 
granted, 42 S. Ct. 587 (1922) [hereinafter Federal Baseball], was perhaps less obviously a 
product of judicial special treatment than has been historically assumed.  See Samuel A. 
Alito, Jr., The Origin of the Baseball Antitrust Exemption: Federal Baseball Club of 
Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Players, 34 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 
183 (2009).  As Justice Alito shows, the Federal Baseball decision was, in many ways, a 
product of its time––a time when the Supreme Court had a very different understanding of 
Congress’s power to legislate pursuant to the Commerce Clause.  Id. at 190–92.  However, 
the more modern Supreme Court baseball antitrust decisions of Toolson v. New York 
Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam), and Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), 
A
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done their best to consider the impact their rulings could have on our 
national pastime, deferring time and again to those who run the game, 
perhaps out of fear for how their rulings could potentially impact this 
civic institution.  “[B]aseball cannot be analogized to any other 
business or even to any other sport or entertainment,”2 wrote the 
Seventh Circuit in 1978, expanding upon Justice Blackmun’s opinion 
in Flood v. Kuhn, the Supreme Court’s final word to date on the 
game’s antitrust exemption.3  So more often than not, it has not been 
analogized as such.  Instead, it usually has been treated as an 
exception—as an entity unique unto itself—as legal concepts such as 
due process, fundamental fairness, and the Sherman Act have all 
taken turns being pushed to the side as the concept of baseball was 
protected above all else.4  As the Seventh Circuit likewise noted in 
1978, the legal business of baseball was something best left to those 
who ran the game.  “Any other conclusion,” a court held in a ruling 
typical of the nature of judicial deference to our national pastime, 
“would involve the courts in not only interpreting often complex rules 
 
rendered in eras wherein Congress’s sweeping power pursuant to the Commerce Clause 
had already been well recognized, are clearly instances of the Court’s special reverence for 
and treatment of our national game. 
2 Finley v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 537 (7th Cir. 1978). 
3 Floyd v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).  In considering baseball’s historically unique 
status, Justice Blackmun reached, among other things, the following four conclusions: 
 1. Professional baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate commerce. 
 2. With its reserve system enjoying exemption from the federal antitrust laws, 
baseball is, in a very distinct sense, an exception and an anomaly.  Federal 
Baseball and Toolson [346 U.S. 256 (1953)] have become an aberration confined 
to baseball. 
 3. Even though others might regard this as ‘unrealistic, inconsistent, or 
illogical,’ see Radovich [352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957)], the aberration is an 
established one, and one that has been recognized not only in Federal Baseball 
and Toolson, but in Shubert [348 U.S. 222 (1955)], International Boxing [348 
U.S. 236 (1955)], and Radovich, as well, a total of five consecutive cases in this 
Court.  It is an aberration that has been with us now for half a century, one 
heretofore deemed fully entitled to the benefit of stare decisis, and one that has 
survived the Court’s expanding concept of interstate commerce.  It rests on a 
recognition and an acceptance of baseball’s unique characteristics and needs. 
 4. Other professional sports operating interstate––football, boxing, basketball, 
and, presumably, hockey and golf––are not so exempt. 
Id. at 282–83 (internal footnotes omitted). 
4 See generally Mitchell Nathanson, The Sovereign Nation of Baseball: Why Federal 
Law Does Not Apply to “America’s Game” and How It Got That Way, 16 VILL. SPORTS & 
ENT. L.J. 49 (2009).  This Article is the second in a series of articles that analyzes the 
relationship between baseball and federal law.  The Sovereign Nation of Baseball is the 
introductory article that lays the historical foundation for the discussion of the topics 
tackled in this Article. 
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of baseball to determine if they were violated but also . . . the ‘intent 
of the (baseball) code,’ an even more complicated and subjective 
task.”5  Of course, there exists no shortage of examples of courts 
injecting themselves into the affairs of other organizations with 
similar, Byzantine codes of conduct.  To the federal judiciary, 
however, baseball was, and is, different.  Courts appear to be more 
willing to defer to or suspend the normal rules that would otherwise 
dictate the resolution of legal issues in order to protect our national 
game.  In the end, a sovereign nation of baseball emerged: an entity 
that grew to become either officially (as in the case of its antitrust 
exemption) or, more often, unofficially exempt from federal law on a 
whole host of issues due to its unique status within American 
society.6 
The Eastern District of Missouri’s 20067 and the Eighth Circuit’s 
20078 decisions in C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, Inc. v. Major 
League Baseball Advanced Media, LP were, at first blush, little more 
than continuations of this longstanding practice.  In rulings that were 
much anticipated by fantasy baseball players everywhere, the courts 
once again justified the suspension of the normal rules of law that 
most likely would have otherwise dictated the outcome and held that 
baseball’s elevated status necessitated a different result in the interest 
of protecting this national asset.  However, this time there was a twist: 
despite the suspension of rules in order to pave the way toward a 
ruling that protected “baseball,” both courts nevertheless held against 
the traditional protectors of the game, Major League Baseball.  This 
holding, although certainly not the rationale that underpinned it, flew 
in the face of nearly a century of federal court decisions.  For decades, 
as courts bent over backward in deference to the game, there was an 
implicit assumption that a ruling for Major League Baseball was 
necessarily a ruling for “baseball” itself—after so many years of 
Major League Baseball holding itself out as the obvious and natural 
guardian of the game, Major League Baseball and the concept of 
“baseball” had become inexorably intertwined.  With these two 
 
5 Finley, 569 F.2d at 539 (alteration in original) (quoting Milwaukee Am. Ass’n. v. 
Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 302 (N.D. Ill. 1931)). 
6 See generally id. (discussing the evolution of Major League Baseball’s effective 
exemption from federal law). 
7 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, LP, 443 F. 
Supp. 2d 1077 (E.D. Mo. 2006), aff’d, 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007). 
8 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mtkg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, LP, 505 
F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 584 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89, 581 
decisions, perhaps, this nexus can no longer be so blithely assumed.  
This Article examines the causes of this shift in perception. 
As this Article discusses, post–World War II societal changes, 
some directly impacting baseball and others with an indirect, but no 
less forceful, impact, have led to a societal and, therefore, judicial, 
separation of the traditional connection between Major League 
Baseball and the larger, more symbolic, concept of “baseball,”9 all of 
which led up to the C.B.C. Distribution decisions that sought to 
protect the game but no longer entrusted Major League Baseball with 
this role.  The rise of the Players Association, the diminishing status 
of club owners as a result of the corporate revolution of the sixties, 
and the public demonization of both that occurred as a result of nearly 
four decades of labor unrest (including, most notably, the cancellation 
of the 1994 World Series) will all be discussed to show that, although 
the symbolic pull of the concept of baseball may still be as strong as 
ever, the power of Major League Baseball as a cultural force is clearly 
on the wane.  As a result, although federal courts are just as likely 
now as they ever were to alter the legal rules of the game to protect 
baseball, the C.B.C. Distribution decisions perhaps signal a shift in 
 
9 As used in this Article, the concept of “baseball” refers to the notion that baseball is 
not merely a game; instead, it speaks to the American way of life and informs American 
values.  Sometimes referred to as the “baseball creed,” it posits that baseball stands in for 
America in name as well as in concept and is a valuable tool in the teaching and promotion 
of American values and ideals.  See STEVEN A. RIESS, TOUCHING BASE: PROFESSIONAL 
BASEBALL AND AMERICAN CULTURE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 7–32 (rev. ed. 1992).  In 
its most overt and cheerleading form (which was its earliest incarnation, in evidence from 
the late nineteenth century through the early decades of the twentieth century), the 
hyperbole was particularly thick: Baseball was promoted as “building manliness, 
character, and an ethic of success;” it molded youngsters, helping boys become better men 
not only through playing but also through simply watching the game; it contributed to the 
public health and was an agent for democratization.  Id. at 17.  All of this was neatly 
summed up by a journalist in 1907 who wrote, “[a] tonic, an exercise, a safety-valve, 
baseball is second only to Death as a leveler.  So long as it remains our national game, 
America will abide no monarchy, and anarchy will be slow.”  Allen Sangree, “Fans” and 
Their Frenzies: The Wholesome Madness of Baseball, 17 EVERYBODY’S MAG. 378, 387 
(1907), quoted in RIESS, supra note 9, at 22.  In later years, baseball events, such as the 
integration of the game in 1947, were painted on a larger canvas as the concept of baseball 
was used to demonstrate American ideals with regard to the end of segregation.  See JULES 
TYGIEL, PAST TIME: BASEBALL AS HISTORY, 158 (2000) [hereinafter PAST TIME].  In fact, 
shortly after Jackie Robinson broke the color line in Major League Baseball, a group of 
promoters sought to send the Brooklyn Dodgers and Cleveland Indians––baseball’s two 
most integrated teams––on a world tour to promote American ideals through the concept 
of baseball.  One promoter stated that it was “most important that the Negro race be well 
represented, as living evidence of the opportunity to reach the top which America’s No. 1 
sport gives all participants regardless of race.”  JULES TYGIEL, BASEBALL’S GREAT 
EXPERIMENT: JACKIE ROBINSON AND HIS LEGACY 335 (1983). 
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judicial deference toward Major League Baseball, as opposed to the 
game itself.  From now on, perhaps the federal judiciary will be more 
likely to rule as the C.B.C. Distribution courts did and to recognize 
that the sovereign nation of baseball is truly sovereign, not even 
answerable to Major League Baseball itself.  For decades, such a 
conclusion would have been unthinkable.  Now, perhaps, it has finally 
become a reality. 
I 
C.B.C. DISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING, INC. V. MAJOR LEAGUE 
BASEBALL ADVANCED MEDIA, LP 
The facts of the C.B.C. Distribution litigation were relatively 
straightforward.  The litigants were Major League Baseball Advanced 
Media (MLB AM), an entity created by Major League Baseball to 
control the Internet and interactive media aspects of Major League 
Baseball, and C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, Inc. (C.B.C.), a 
corporation that provided a variety of products, including the 
statistics, that facilitated fantasy baseball games over the Internet.10  
MLB AM signed a five-year $50 million deal with the Major League 
Baseball Players Association in 2005 in order to acquire what it 
believed to be the exclusive rights to the players’ names and statistics 
for use in fantasy baseball as well as other forms of online content.11  
In order to protect what it considered to be its property right, MLB 
AM charged a licensing fee to online companies involved in fantasy 
baseball and issued cease and desist letters to those companies that 
refused to pay up.  C.B.C. balked at the fee, contending that, because 
the statistics were within the public domain—available to anyone who 
picked up a newspaper or any of the myriad of baseball publications 
available on the newsstand—it had a First Amendment right to use 
the statistics.12  MLB AM disagreed, reiterating that it had purchased 
exclusive rights to them irrespective of the reality that they were 
 
10 Surina Mann, Comment, C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, Inc. v. Major League 
Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.: The First Amendment Versus the Right of Publicity in the 
Eighth Circuit, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 303, 313 (2009). 
11 Stacey B. Evans, Comment, Whose Stats Are They Anyway? Analyzing the Battle 
Between Major League Baseball and Fantasy Game Sites, 9 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L., 
335, 339 (2008). 
12 Id. 
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otherwise publicly available.  As such, MLB AM contended that it 
was entitled to enforce those rights.13 
Several years earlier (and prior to the agreement between MLB 
AM and the Players Association), in 1995, C.B.C. entered into 
licensing agreements with the Players Association that permitted 
C.B.C. to use “the logo, name, and symbol of the Players’ 
Association, identified as the Trademarks, and the ‘names, 
nicknames, likenesses, signatures, pictures, playing records, and/or 
biographical data of each player . . . for sale . . . advertising, 
promotion, and distribution of certain products,” including, obviously, 
its online fantasy baseball games.14  These agreements expired on 
December 31, 2004.15  Interestingly, and as the District Court noted, 
“[b]etween 2001 and January 2004, Advanced Media [MLB AM] 
offered fantasy baseball games on MLB.com without obtaining a 
license and without obtaining permission from the Players’ 
Association.”16  In 2005, however, MLB AM and the Players 
Association reached the above-stated agreement and, on February 4, 
2005, the joint venture approached C.B.C., proposing that C.B.C. 
promote MLB AM’s fantasy baseball games on C.B.C.’s Web site in 
exchange for a percentage of the resulting profits.  C.B.C. then filed 
for declaratory relief, seeking a ruling that declared its First 
Amendment right to use the names and statistics of Major League 
players without obtaining a licensing agreement.17  MLB AM 
counterclaimed, alleging that such use would violate the players’ 
rights of publicity.18  Thus the stage was set for the showdown 
between the First Amendment and the right of publicity within the 
context of online fantasy baseball games. 
Ironically, Major League Baseball had been on the other side of 
this argument just a few years earlier when Al Gionfriddo, along with 
fellow Major League players from the thirties and forties, Pete 
Coscarart, Dolph Camilli, and Frankie Crosetti, sued Major League 
Baseball in California state court for using their likenesses without 
their consent in the Major League Baseball All-Star Game and World 
 
13 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, LP, 443 F. 
Supp. 2d 1077, 1092, 1101–02 (E.D. Mo. 2006), aff’d, 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007). 
14 Id. at 1080–81. 
15 Id. at 1080. 
16 Id. at 1081. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 1082. 
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Series programs, as well as on the Major League Baseball Web site.19  
There, the players alleged that their statutory and common law rights 
of publicity were violated, while Major League Baseball defended 
itself by invoking the First Amendment.  With regard to the common 
law claim, after balancing the players’ rights against “the public 
interest in the dissemination of news and information consistent with 
the democratic processes under the constitutional guaranties of 
freedom of speech and of the press,”20 the California Court of Appeal 
held that the balance tipped in favor of Major League Baseball and 
the First Amendment, noting that the public interest in baseball was 
significant: “Major league baseball is followed by millions of people 
across this country on a daily basis.  Likewise, baseball fans have an 
abiding interest in the history of the game.  The public has an 
enduring fascination in the records set by former players and in 
memorable moments from previous games.”21  As such, “[b]alancing 
plaintiffs’ negligible economic interests against the public’s enduring 
fascination with baseball’s past, we conclude that the public interest 
favoring the free dissemination of information regarding baseball’s 
history far outweighs any proprietary interests at stake.”22  The court 
went even further with regard to the plaintiffs’ statutory claim, stating 
that “[b]aseball . . . is, after all, ‘the national pastime.’  In view of 
baseball’s pervasive influence on our culture, we conclude that the 
types of uses raised in the record before us are among the ‘public 
affairs’ uses exempt from consent [under the statute].”23  Once again, 
and consistent with the treatment of the game by its brethren in the 
federal judiciary, the California appellate court held that baseball, 
being baseball, necessitated a different outcome than otherwise might 
have been the case. 
The district court in the C.B.C. Distribution case did not even need 
to engage in a balancing of interests, holding that the players did not 
meet their burden of proving that their rights of publicity under 
Missouri law had been violated.24  On appeal, the Eighth Circuit went 
even further in protecting the interest of “baseball” by disagreeing 
 
19 Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 310–11 (Cal. App. 1 
Dist. 2001). 
20 Id. at 313 (quoting Gill v. Hearst Publ’g, Co., 253 P.2d 441, 444 (Cal. 1953)). 
21 Id. at 315. 
22 Id. at 318. 
23 Id. at 319. 
24 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, LP, 443 F. 
Supp. 2d 1077, 1089 (E.D. Mo. 2007), aff’d, 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007). 
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with the lower court in its ruling with regard to the players’ rights of 
publicity.  Here, the court held that the players did indeed meet all 
three prongs of Missouri’s right of publicity test, but nevertheless 
held that this was irrelevant.25  Even though the court held that C.B.C. 
used the players’ names as symbols of its identity without their 
consent and with the intent of obtaining a commercial advantage, it 
was allowed to do so under the First Amendment given the national 
interest in baseball.  Consistent with the Gionfriddo court, the C.B.C. 
court held that, because the information at issue was already within 
the public domain, “it would be strange law that a person would not 
have a first amendment right to use information that is available to 
everyone.”26  Further, the court rested its decision with regard to the 
balance between private and public interest by reciting the familiar 
litany of the national obsession with baseball: “Courts have also 
recognized the public value of information about the game of baseball 
and its players, referring to baseball as ‘the national pastime.’”27 
Quoting Gionfriddo, the court concluded by noting that the 
“‘recitation and discussion of factual data concerning the athletic 
performance of [players on Major League Baseball’s Web site] 
command a substantial public interest, and, therefore, is a form of 
expression due substantial constitutional protection.’  We find these 
views persuasive.”28  Like the Gionfriddo court, here the Eighth 
Circuit ruled that, regardless of the private rights at issue (which were 
perhaps insubstantial in the Gionfriddo case, as the court noted the 
limited instances in which these old-time ballplayers’ likenesses were 
in fact used by Major League Baseball,29 but which were certainly 
much more substantial in the C.B.C. litigation, given that fantasy 
baseball is an industry that generates several hundred million dollars 
each year that could not exist without the players involved in that 
 
25 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, LP, 505 
F.3d 818, 822 (8th Cir. 2007) (“In Missouri, ‘the elements of a right of publicity action 
include: (1) That defendant used plaintiff’s name as a symbol of his identity (2) without 
consent (3) and with the intent to obtain a commercial advantage.” (quoting Doe v. TCI 
Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 369 (Mo. 2003))). 
26 Id. at 823. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 823–24 (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted). 
29 See Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 316–17 (Cal. App. 
1 Div. 2001).  The court noted that although the plaintiffs alleged that Major League 
Baseball affixed their names or images to merchandise such as T-shirts, lithographic 
prints, or other baseball souvenirs, “they were unable to present any evidence to the trial 
court of such uses by Baseball.”  Id. at 317. 
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case30), these personal interests would most likely never be 
significant enough to trump the public interest in protecting our 
national pastime.  Unlike Gionfriddo, however, here the decision was 
one that went against Major League Baseball.  In a departure from 
historical precedent, the Eighth Circuit held that it was Major League 
Baseball that was impeding the public interest in baseball, not 
protecting it.  Such a conclusion would have been unheard of just a 
generation or two earlier.  For decades, Major League Baseball and 
the club owners who dominated the game prior to the ascension of the 
Players Association in the seventies and eighties were larger-than-life 
figures who were not shy about promoting their role as guardians of 
our national game.  And the public, as well as the judiciary, 
compliantly deferred to them largely without question.  As such, 
rulings in favor of Major League Baseball were unquestionably 
considered rulings in furtherance of the concept of baseball as well.  
The two were inseparable, both in the public’s eye as well as the 
judiciary’s. 
II 
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL AND BASEBALL AS SYNONYMS 
This national deference has its roots in the birth of the National 
League (also known as the NL) back in 1876.  This new league, an 
answer to the player-run National Association that had become 
overrun with allegations of gambling, cheating, and player 
“revolving” (jumping from one team to another in search of higher 
wages), was tightly controlled by the club owners—the self-
proclaimed “magnates” who took it upon themselves to solve 
professional baseball’s problems by subordinating the role of the 
players and by providing themselves with virtually unlimited power 
and, in the process, prestige.31  By 1879, all league owners agreed 
upon the “reserve rule,” which prevented revolving by permitting club 
owners to control their players from one year to the next into eternity 
unless or until the owner decided to release them.32  They likewise 
refused to allow the players any voice in league governance and 
 
30 See Mann, supra note 10 (noting that, in 2006, approximately sixteen million adults 
played fantasy sports, spending an average of about $500 each). 
31 See Mitchell Nathanson, Gatekeepers of Americana: Ownership’s Never-Ending 
Quest for Control of the Baseball Creed, 15 NINE: A JOURNAL OF BASEBALL HISTORY 
AND CULTURE 68, 71 (2006). 
32 Id. 
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instilled various league rules and policies that aspired to appeal to the 
White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) elites, who ran the country at 
the time, in the hope that these national leaders would see in the 
league owners individuals worthy of respect and, accordingly, 
deference.33  In its earliest incarnation, the newly formed National 
League was a bastion of Victorian values, embracing and emulating 
the “blue laws” enacted by the Northeastern WASP elites who 
dominated local legislatures and who considered such laws crucial, 
particularly in the wake of the immigration boom in the late 
nineteenth century, to the preservation of their heritage and way of 
life.34  As such, the National League banned Sunday baseball and the 
sale of alcohol at league games.35  In addition, admission prices were 
kept high precisely to encourage the “respectable classes” to attend 
and to discourage attendance by lower-class fans.36  Together, all of 
this resulted, in the opinion of Chicago owner Albert Spalding, in 
crowds “composed of the best class of people . . . and no theater, 
church, or place of amusement contains a finer class of people than 
can be found in our grandstands.”37 
Once established, these club owners were not shy about informing 
the American public of their accomplishments in service to the 
Victorian values they helped to protect and promote.  They 
nourished the legend that the NL saved professional baseball from 
utter ruin.  Had it not been for the timely creation of the NL and the 
sagacious decisions of its leaders, so the fable went, the national 
pastime would have continued its downward slide into complete 
degradation.  . . .  [T]the NL ostentatiously presented itself as the 
national pastime’s main moral guardian.38 
In this way, by rescuing the game “from its slough of corruption and 
disgrace,” as they boasted, the owners presented themselves to the 
public as nothing less than American heroes.39  With the game 
proudly and firmly in their hands, it was only natural that the public 
would see the club owners as benevolent “magnates,” operating their 
 
33 See BENJAMIN G. RADER, BASEBALL: A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S GAME 44 (2d ed. 
2002). 
34 See RIESS, supra note 9, at 138–39. 
35 HAROLD SEYMOUR, BASEBALL: THE EARLY YEARS 92 (1989 ed.). 
36 See RIESS, supra note 9, at 33. 
37 Id. 
38 See RADER, supra note 33, at 50. 
39 See SEYMOUR, supra note 35, at 81. 
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clubs in the public interest.40  In such an atmosphere, deference to 
these “selfless philanthropists” (as they were sometimes referred to by 
a fawning media)41 was inevitable. 
For decades, their hold upon the game remained firm as their 
power only tightened.  Once the American League joined the National 
League in 1901, forming the structure of Major League Baseball that 
remains today, the cabal of sixteen club owners not only ran the game 
from the inside but, in many ways, represented its conscience.  For 
over five decades the game remained largely unchanged: the Major 
Leagues of the fifties looked very much like the Major Leagues that 
had existed at the turn of the twentieth century.  Although a few teams 
had recently relocated (to Milwaukee, Baltimore, Kansas City, Los 
Angeles, and San Francisco), the essence of the cabal that was Major 
League Baseball ownership remained unchanged—there were still 
sixteen clubs—no more.  And the players were as powerless in 1960 
as they had been in 1876.  Notwithstanding the minor annoyances of 
relocation, Major League Baseball was still very much an owners’ 
game.  The players were a necessary inconvenience but little more; it 
was the owners who made nearly every decision relevant to the game.  
The players were subservient: a secondary concern in all areas apart 
from the nine innings or so they trotted on and off the field 154 times 
each season.  The owners’ status as the moral conscience of our 
national pastime seemed perpetual, as their fraternity was so 
entrenched in the national consciousness that several of them were 
household names: Topping, Webb, Wrigley, Stoneham, Crosley, 
Carpenter, Yawkey, O’Malley, and so on.  They were in many ways 
larger-than-life figures.  By their very presence, they demanded 
respect.  And more often than not they got it. 
Because they represented the game’s moral conscience, they were 
entrusted, by both the players as well as the public, to act without 
self-interest in running, and in the process protecting, the game.  As 
such, the concept of benevolent paternalism ran deep.  Club owners, 
as well as team and league management, hammered this theme home 
time and again whenever challenges to the structure of the game were 
 
40 See PAST TIME, supra note 9, at 48.  In reality, the club owners were far from 
magnates, particularly the earliest ones.  Instead, they were more often self-made, well-to-
do merchants or moderately prosperous businessmen.  They were certainly successful 
when viewed within the context of their era, but they were hardly magnates on par with the 
industrial and financial giants (e.g., Rockefeller, Carnegie) who more appropriately went 
by that title.  Id. 
41 See RIESS, supra note 9, at 55. 
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raised.  Trust us, they exhorted, we have everyone’s best interest at 
heart.42  As the nascent Players Association began to rumble from 
below, the owners pleaded for deference.  And for many years, the 
players complied.  In 1958, Cleveland Indians General Manager 
Frank Lane warned his players of the evils of unionization by 
reminding them of the “ghost towns” in New England that he asserted 
were created by union greed, cautioning that similar results could 
very well come about in baseball if the union influence seeped in 
there as well.  He pleaded for his players’ trust, assuring them that he 
was “your general manager, as well as for the clubs.  You have to 
have confidence in me.”43 
Lane’s plea was typical of the stance that management had taken 
toward the game and of how they expected to be viewed by both their 
players as well as the American public.  Owners had acted as manor 
lords for generations, doling out privileges to “their” players on their 
whim, and withholding the privileges likewise, all in the name of 
protecting the national pastime.  Gussie Busch of the St. Louis 
Cardinals was perhaps one of the more notable in this regard, but he 
was not much different from most of his brethren, offering perks to 
his favored players, such as a restaurant for Stan Musial, a beer 
distributorship for Roger Maris, and a yacht for Lou Brock.44  To 
Busch, patronage and paternalism were the defining characteristics of 
his job description.  Most players, whether they played for Busch’s 
Cardinals or elsewhere, were lulled into complacency for decades by 
management’s oft-repeated phrase: “we’ll take care of you.”45  
Longtime Dodgers General Manager Buzzi Bavasi often talked 
publicly about “his” boys and used the trust that this mindset 
engendered to his advantage come contract time, when his players 
became unknowing stooges in his financial shell game.  In fact, in a 
series of 1967 Sports Illustrated articles, he even boasted of his ability 
to take advantage of the trust he worked so hard to engender come 
contract time.  He bragged of his trick of pulling out fake contracts, 
misrepresenting the salaries of other players in his attempt to 
convince the player in his office to accept his lowball offer.46  “Some 
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ballplayers just don’t understand money at all,” he said, “or they don’t 
stop to figure things out . . . [and] you could take advantage of them 
something frightful.”47 
I’ve pulled that phony-contract stunt a dozen times, and I’ll do it 
every chance I get, because this war of negotiations has no rules . . . 
[and] the easiest players to deal with are the ones who leave it all up 
to you.  They have enough faith in me to know that they are going 
to be paid what they’re worth.48 
The players were not the only ones to fall under management’s 
spell.  Most baseball writers likewise preached deference to the 
owners’ sensibilities, concluding that, as the obvious guardians of the 
game, they would take care of everyone within their orbit.  When it 
came to labor issues, there was no issue to many of them; the owners 
would naturally take care of “their boys.”49  As a result of this 
mindset, even before Marvin Miller ascended to the head of the 
Players Association and led a more aggressive union, sympathy from 
most writers, and consequently most fans, lay with the owners.50  
This sympathy found its way into the federal courts, which oftentimes 
deferred to those who ran the game51 under the assumption that the 
owners not only understood baseball better than the courts did (in 
which they were most likely correct) but also that the owners would 
naturally do whatever they could to selflessly protect baseball (in 
which, judging by the comments of Lane and Bavasi, they most likely 
were not).  To most interested spectators, either within the game or on 
the outside, Major League Baseball and the concept of baseball were 
one and the same, with trust and power granted to the former 
inevitably inuring to the latter.  Over time, however, many of these 
spectators would start to see things differently.  Among the first were 
the players themselves, the ones most directly impacted by this 
culture of deference. 
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III 
THE RISE OF THE PLAYERS 
It was Aristotle, not Marvin Miller, who first recognized “that 
authority in any society is always in danger of degenerating into a 
cynical and manipulative power struggle . . . whenever ‘persons of 
great ability, and second to none in their merits, are treated 
dishonorably by those who enjoy the highest honors.’”52  Aristotle 
may have never met Tom Yawkey, Walter O’Malley, or their cohorts, 
but it was as if he had them in mind.  For decades, despite their 
selfless public stance to the contrary, it seemed as if it was the 
owners’ primary responsibility to degrade and denigrate their players 
whenever and however possible in their perpetual quest to maintain 
control over them and keep salaries low.  Once the players began to 
recognize their own worth, however, they began to fight back by 
drawing public attention to the disparity between the owners’ public 
and private faces.  In the process, the owners began to suffer a decline 
in respect as more and more people began to question whether the 
owners were as benevolent as they had always proclaimed themselves 
to be. 
Irrespective of their public proclamations, club owners always 
considered it of utmost importance to beat into their players that, 
despite their talents on the field, it was the owners who constituted the 
essence of the game.  As such, they were justly entitled to deference 
in practically any issue that pertained to baseball.  Although much of 
their blather was in furtherance of the owners’ pursuit of status, there 
were obvious financial benefits to this tactic as well.  If the players 
could be convinced that they were fortunate just to be playing ball for 
a living and that they could easily be replaced at any moment, salary 
negotiations would be a breeze in most cases.  Much of ownership’s 
treatment of players served to confirm this supposition and bludgeon 
the players into a subservient role.  For decades, most players were 
paid only during the season; during the winters they were on their 
own.53  This treatment was consistent with the notion that 
professional ball playing was a privilege; when the privilege ended 
every October, so did the paychecks.  What the players did for rent 
and food money during the off-season could not be the owners’ 
concern.  Until “Murphy money”—spring training stipends—came 
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along in the late forties (the result of the near unionization of the 
Pirates in 1946 by labor lawyer Robert Murphy), players were 
responsible for their own spring training expenses even though they 
were required to attend.54  They were also expected to purchase their 
own gloves and shoes.55  Travel was brutal, with road trips averaging 
between twenty-one and thirty days at a clip, thereby putting 
tremendous emotional strain on young families, leading to the 
dissolution of many marriages and families.56  All of this for the 
privilege of playing Major League baseball.  Although life in the 
minors was far worse in some respects, occasionally a promotion to 
the Major Leagues represented a step down for a player: after starring 
for Baltimore in the International League in 1949, pitcher Al 
Widmar’s 1950 contract was purchased by the St. Louis Browns—
complete with a $2000 pay cut.57  Widmar’s situation was hardly 
unique.  When players finally made it to the big leagues, they were 
immediately disavowed of any notion that they had achieved any sort 
of stature within the game. 
And then came the yearly contract negotiations.  Regardless of the 
season a player had just completed, the message was the same: just be 
glad you’re still on the roster.  St. Louis Browns owner William O. 
DeWitt could seemingly never be impressed; his team finished in the 
basement regardless of the performance of any one player.  From his 
perspective, no one player could have any particular worth to him at 
all and he was not shy in informing them of this.  Players requesting a 
salary boost on the basis of recent performance were quickly set 
straight: DeWitt would find a way to disparage their talents anyway.  
And if he couldn’t, he fell back on the old reliable: the sorry financial 
state of the Browns that, he claimed, made significant raises 
impossible.58  DeWitt’s strategy was a familiar one, as most clubs 
tried similar tricks.  The underlying goal was always the same: to 
convince the player that regardless of his salary he was overpaid.  
Brooklyn Dodgers President Branch Rickey was a master at the art of 
contract negotiation, going so far as to boast that actual negotiations 
were occurring, despite the presence of the reserve clause that left 
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players ultimately with no option other than to accept whatever their 
club offered.  One witness to Rickey’s act considered him nothing 
less than an “ethical fraud” come contract time.59  Even players on the 
few teams making healthy profits were abused at the so-called 
bargaining table.  After winning the 1956 Triple Crown, Mickey 
Mantle approached Yankee General Manager George Weiss seeking a 
significant raise.  Weiss replied that Mantle ought to keep his mouth 
shut and threatened that, if he did not accept the team’s offer, Weiss 
would have no choice but to turn over to Mantle’s wife the findings of 
the private detective Weiss had hired to follow Mantle and teammate 
Billy Martin.60  Whether a player suited up for the woeful Browns or 
the majestic Yankees, the message was unchanged: the owners 
deserved their positions within the game; the players did not.  The 
concept of privilege was constantly drummed into their heads. 
It was true that, despite the harsh realities of professional ball 
playing in the forties, fifties, and sixties, the life of a Major League 
baseball player was a comfortable one, relatively speaking.  Even 
though they were squeezed during contract time and unpaid during 
the off-season, many players were relatively well off (although 
certainly not the hordes earning salaries at or near the four-figure 
Major League minimum that existed throughout that era) as compared 
with society overall.  In 1950, the average Major League salary was 
$11,000; U.S. Senators earned $12,500, physicians earned on the 
average $12,324, attorneys earned $8349, dentists earned $7436, and 
schoolteachers earned $2794.61  However, with farm systems now so 
large and so many minor league players seemingly ready to take their 
place (26.7 for every major league position as compared with only 5.9 
in 1990),62 players had no job security and, hence, no rights.  Soon, 
the mere privilege of playing Major League ball for a living was no 
longer enough. 
There had always been sporadic player uprisings, dating back to 
the nineteenth century with the formation of John Montgomery 
Ward’s Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball Players and the 
creation of the Players League in 1890 (formed as a rebellion against 
the oppressive National League).63  However, none of these earlier 
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movements could be sustained over the long haul; eventually, the 
aggrieved players would come back to the fold, and the business of 
Major League Baseball would continue as it always had.  By the 
forties, a more sustained movement began to take root, although it 
certainly seemed toothless and harmless for many years. 
The near unionization of the Pirates in 1946 was an early example 
of the awakening of the players, and although the movement failed, 
albeit barely, the rumbles of discontent began to brew.  The owners 
realized that they needed to pass at least superficial reforms in order 
to quell the murmurs of discontent, so in 1946, along with the Murphy 
money, they created a pension plan for the players, complete with 
player representatives on the pension committee.64  Their input was 
consistently ignored, however.  After requesting modest increases to 
the pension plan and being turned down flat, player representatives 
Ralph Kiner and Allie Reynolds decided to hire a lawyer, J. Norman 
Lewis, and bring him to the December 1953 winter meetings.65  The 
owners then agreed to meet with the players but instructed them to 
leave Lewis out in the hotel’s foyer.66  The frustrated player 
representatives then met with each other and agreed to form what was 
to be known as the Major League Baseball Players Association when 
it became operational on July 12, 1954.67 
Although the received wisdom holds that the Players Association 
was an impotent body prior to the arrival of Marvin Miller, it was 
successful in laying the foundation necessary for Miller to succeed.  
From the outset, the Players Association was effective, at least 
occasionally, as an information-gathering and dissemination body.  
This was crucial in enlightening the players as to the realities of their 
situation.  In 1958, the law firm retained by the Players Association 
(the retention of a law firm being, by itself, a monumental step by the 
players) released its “Salary Report for Major League Baseball 
Players,” which was distributed to the representative of each team.68  
Although its conclusion—that the players were underpaid—was 
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hardly surprising, its significance lay in the methods used to 
demonstrate precisely why and how this was so.  By showing the 
players how they were being taken advantage of rather than merely 
telling them what they already knew, the report empowered the 
players to speak with authority and specificity on the financial side of 
the game rather than in the general platitudes (e.g., “I was ripped 
off.”) that were common to earlier eras and easy to brush aside.  For 
instance, the report discussed relative cost of living standards as a 
means to compare salaries across eras.  By doing this, it was able to 
clearly convey just why it was that, although the minimum salary had 
recently been raised from $6000 to $7000, the players were 
nevertheless in worse financial shape than they had been in just a few 
years earlier.69  It also pointed out that, in 1929, team salaries 
accounted for 35.3% of Major League expenses whereas by 1956 that 
percentage had dropped to 12.9%.70  The implications of this were 
clear: the owners were making more money than ever before but were 
pocketing all of the profits.  As it was, the players were being ripped 
off; only now they knew the particulars of the theft.  With knowledge 
comes power, and the Salary Report provided the theoretical 
foundation for what was to come later.  If the presence of the farm 
system and reserve clause thwarted the players from acting 
individually, they finally were coming to the realization that they 
would have to band together and attack the problem as a collective. 
By the sixties, the “Depression-era mindset” of the players, where 
they were happy just to be in the big leagues, was disappearing.  Red 
Sox owner Tom Yawkey once boasted, “[t]o me the greatest example 
of American democracy is the right a player has to sit down with a 
general manager and negotiate his contract.”71  Buzzi Bavasi’s 1967 
Sports Illustrated article exposed Yawkey’s fiction, as would the 
series of events that followed that would be viewed, at least in 
retrospect, as the turning point in the balance of power within the 
game—the 1966 appointment of Marvin Miller as Executive Director 
of the Players Association.  That spring, he toured spring training 
camps and was educated as to the players’ developing mindset.  Later 
he encouraged players to attend bargaining sessions with the owners 
so they could see for themselves what they were up against.72  Very 
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quickly, players became extremely well informed.  They witnessed 
firsthand the stonewalling and evasive tactics used by the same 
owners who had always told the players to trust them because they 
had the players’ best interests in mind.  A few minutes in a bargaining 
session disavowed them of that belief.  They saw how the owners 
were willing to use any weapon available to them against the players, 
no matter how trivial the point at issue was.  The unreasonableness of 
the owners was perhaps never so clearly demonstrated than in the 
reaction of Giants General Manager Chub Feeney to an offhand 
remark made by pitcher Jim Bouton.  When Bouton suggested, 
facetiously, at a bargaining session that a player be granted free 
agency at age sixty-five, Feeney growled in response, “No, because 
that would give you a foot in the door.”73 
In one sense, Feeney’s reaction was to be expected.  For what was 
being contested during these bargaining sessions was the point made 
by the owners for decades: that they, not the players, constituted the 
essence of the game and, as such, were rightfully entrusted with the 
role of deciding what was in the best interests of the game.  This 
mindset was behind much of what Commissioner Bowie Kuhn 
imparted to the media throughout the turbulent bargaining sessions 
that defined his tenure (1969–84).  “I will say,” he remarked in a 
typical comment uttered in 1980, “that the greatest long-term interest 
in the game is held by the club people.  Their financial interest is 
longest and deepest.  They’ll still be around as the generations of 
players pass.”74  Reds General Manager Bob Howsam sounded a 
similar theme in 1973 when he pitted the players not only against 
management but against America in general.  In his view, 
management protected the game and its American ideals (i.e., the 
concept of baseball), whereas the players wanted to destroy “the 
institution that reflects all that is America . . . the freedoms we cherish 
and the liberties we defend.”75  In short, the owners looked out for 
baseball whereas the players looked out only for themselves. 
Miller, obviously, saw things differently.  Through time, he was 
able to convince the players that it was they, not the owners, who 
defined the game of baseball.  Soon, the players were issuing 
statements of their own, challenging the owners’, and consequently 
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the public’s, worldview.  In 1967, Mets pitcher Jack Fisher addressed 
his fellow players as well as the owners present at a bargaining 
session: “It’s a matter of taking pride in your profession. . . . We don’t 
think we’d be fighting for ourselves.  We’d be fighting for 
baseball.”76  As this mindset took hold among the players, they began 
speaking of their baseball careers as professions that came with rights 
and not merely privileges.  This theme particularly hit home with Curt 
Flood and other black players, given the civil rights and black power 
movements that provided the backdrop to the era. 
In his December 24, 1969, letter to Kuhn requesting free agency, 
Flood turned the owners’ arguments on their head, implying that, 
when it came to doling out rights and privileges, the owners had 
things backward.  He wrote: 
After 12 years in the major leagues, I do not feel that I am a piece of 
property to be bought and sold irrespective of my wishes.  I believe 
that any system that produces that result violates my basic rights as 
a citizen and is inconsistent with the laws of the United States and 
the several states.77 
According to Flood, if anything, it was the owners who should have 
considered themselves privileged simply to maintain an association 
with our national pastime; all that was required of them was a 
sufficiently fat wallet.  The players, on the other hand, due to their 
unique skills, were entitled to their presence in the game on merit 
alone.  For that reason, a generous cut of the profits derived from the 
game was rightfully theirs as well.  Flood continued to hammer away 
at the owners throughout his battle.  The following year, in an 
interview, he remarked:  “They say baseball is the all-American sport.  
When you think of all-American, you would think of something 
democratic, something free.”78  The decades of blather by the owners 
about their role as protectors of our national pastime had finally come 
back to bite them.  If they truly meant what they said, they would 
have to set the players free.  As players such as Flood pointed out, any 
other result would be absurd. 
The modicum of integration that had occurred in the two decades 
or so since the debut of Jackie Robinson in 1947 presented the players 
at last with leaders like Flood who, through their words, actions, and 
mere presence, gave confidence to other players, black and white, to 
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stand up for themselves.  In his stand, Flood convinced many players 
who previously were on the fence with regard to the Players 
Association that its cause was just.  Through Flood, they were able to 
see that their demands were not selfish; they were representative of 
something bigger than simply wanting a larger slice of the financial 
pie.  It was this mindset that led to successive collective bargaining 
agreements that steadily ratcheted minimum player salaries up to 
acceptable levels after decades of stagnation.79  Although the extra 
income realized through these agreements was certainly welcome, the 
collective bargaining agreements were ultimately not just about 
money.  They were also about power.  They were about rights and 
privileges and who, as between the players and the owners, most 
appropriately lined up on which side of the ledger.  And as the players 
gained power and prestige through each successive collective 
bargaining agreement, the owners lost some of theirs in the process.  
Flood’s quest was certainly instrumental in this narrative shift, but it 
was merely part of the larger movement led by Miller that compelled 
the public to question its faith in the owners as benevolent protectors 
of our national game. 
The narrative Miller put before the American public was hardly the 
romantic one of baseball and American history that the owners had 
peddled for decades.  Rather, it was a brutal “slave narrative” where 
the allegedly privileged players were not granted even the most basic 
rights afforded to ordinary citizens.80  He, and later other player 
spokesmen as well, “employed the language of labor—scabs, work 
stoppages, picket lines”81—to align the players with the powerful 
labor movement of the era, and he chose his words carefully with the 
intent of provoking the owners as well as the public to acknowledge 
the reality of baseball’s management-labor relationship that had been 
up to then blissfully ignored in favor of the more optimistic, 
reassuring myth of benevolent paternalism.  At one point in 1973, 
Miller invoked the sting of baseball’s segregationist past by 
remarking that any gains made by the Players Association could 
easily be thwarted by a “gentlemen’s agreement” between the owners, 
a statement that recalled the so-called “gentlemen’s agreement” that 
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kept black players out of the game for decades.82  Miller’s choice of 
the phrase was intentional; there existed beneath the veneer of our 
national pastime something unsavory and cruel about the business of 
baseball and Miller wanted everyone to be cognizant of it.  In his 
words and actions, Miller attempted to demonstrate that the owners 
were not to be trusted and that they were merely presenting a facade 
of themselves as romantic baseball men “using tradition to mask self-
interest.”83  They were hardly the gentlemen they portrayed 
themselves to be. 
In essence, Miller was on a crusade to show that the concept of 
benevolent paternalism simply did not exist within the game of 
baseball.  In order to make his point, he had to break the stereotype of 
the “aw shucks, gee-whiz, I’m so glad to be a major leaguer that I 
would pay to put on the uniform” player of romantic myth.84  
Although the realities of Major League Baseball never aligned with 
this myth, it nevertheless served the owners well for decades, 
permitting them free rein to pay the players less than their true value, 
allowing them to withhold benefits, and ensuring that no player could 
speak up without fear of public censure.  By breaking the chains of 
this myth and allowing the players a voice in their profession, Miller 
effectively marginalized the role of the owners in the overall 
stewardship of the game.  As he portrayed them, they were cruel, 
petty, self-interested people who were not to be trusted.  Not by the 
public and, ultimately, not by the judiciary either. 
The Players Association was not the sole cause of the owners’ 
collective loss of status and, consequently, national deference, 
however.  They were also done in by newer, improved versions of 
themselves—products of a post–World War II corporate revolution 
that changed the face of American business, causing it to become 
more powerful yet less visible all at once.  When this revolution hit 
Major League Baseball, the owners disappeared from the national 
stage for good. 
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IV 
THE CORPORATE REVOLUTION 
Much of the rationale for the traditional judicial deference to Major 
League Baseball came from the judiciary’s comfort in entrusting the 
thorny legal issues of baseball to the well-known stewards of the 
game.  As stated earlier, the owners who ran the game up through the 
fifties were household names who had, at least in the public eye, long 
demonstrated their baseball bona fides.  There had always been some 
turnover in ownership ranks but the stalwarts—the O’Malleys, the 
Yawkeys, the Crosleys, the Carpenters, the Wrigleys, et al.—had 
seemingly been “baseball men” forever and had accumulated a 
presupposed institutional knowledge of the business of baseball that 
many courts were hesitant to challenge.  Just as importantly, although 
the owners bickered among themselves on more trivial issues, they 
often spoke with a unified voice on the bigger issues concerning the 
game.  As such, in deferring to Major League Baseball, courts could 
be reassured that they were entrusting the resolution of significant 
questions to a well-known, learned body of baseball “experts.” 
Beginning in the sixties, however, things began to change.  Slowly 
at first, but then more rapidly as the decades passed, owners began 
coming and going more frequently.85  With the increase in turnover, 
they became increasingly anonymous.  In addition, and partially as a 
result of the increase in turnover, the cohesiveness of the owners’ 
“voice” began to dissipate as club owners now disagreed on more 
fundamental questions concerning the game.  By the eighties and 
nineties, deferring to the owners increasingly led to more questions 
than answers:  Who were the owners?  What did they stand for?  How 
would they protect the game of baseball?  How could they protect the 
game of baseball given their increasingly disparate interests?  By the 
time of the 2006 and 2007 C.B.C. decisions, deference to Major 
League Baseball was a far less reassuring prospect than it had ever 
been before.  In short, the people at the ownership table by 1980 were 
far different in temperament and background than those sitting in 
those same chairs in 1960.  They were the products of a corporate 
revolution in America that, although not publicized nearly to the 
degree as the student and counter-culture revolutions of the same era, 
changed the fundamental nature of corporate America86 and, 
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naturally, baseball’s ownership group as well.  Ironically, these new 
owners were far more powerful, in a global sense, than their 
predecessors, but it was their power that caused them to fray as a 
group and become, collectively, weaker.  As they weakened, their 
ability to speak not merely for themselves but for “baseball” waned 
significantly. 
Traditionally, owning a Major League Baseball team was a 
relatively simple, straightforward proposition.  The economics were 
rudimentary—the vast majority of revenue stemmed from gate 
receipts along with a trickle from radio.87  Expenses were minimal 
given that salaries and ticket prices were low.  In this atmosphere, 
owning a baseball team was little more than a vanity investment.  Just 
as in the nineteenth century, these non-players sought a connection to 
the game more for the status it brought them than the income it 
generated.  Making money was not, and could not, be a primary 
motivation, as there was not much generated.  As one sports 
economist concluded of the prewar era, “even the most successful ball 
team’s revenues were no more than those of a department store or a 
large supermarket.”88  In this atmosphere, owners had the luxury of 
considering themselves amateur sportsmen.  “Mr. [Phil] Wrigley 
never took a penny out of the ball club, never took a dividend,” said 
Cubs Business Manager E.R. “Salty” Saltzman.89  “He didn’t care 
much about profits; he just didn’t care to subsidize losses.”90  
Because being a member of this elite fraternity was what mattered 
most, cohesiveness and solidarity among owners was not a problem.  
All of this resulted in a position of status that demanded deference, 
judicial and otherwise. 
Of course, there were always divisions among owners, and 
squabbles and grudges abounded.  However, when it came to the 
proverbial “big picture,” the operation of the business of baseball, 
they had every incentive to act in lock step.  To do otherwise would 
cost them money that many of them simply did not have.91  They 
could strike out on their own, sign the best prospects without regard 
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to price, and take on veteran players with higher contracts to help 
them in a play-off push, but these tactics were risky.  If these moves 
failed to translate into success on the diamond, they would not see 
much of an increase in ticket sales, and then they would be left with 
bloated expenses without any way to balance their ledger sheets at the 
end of the season.92  Or they could be content with life in the second 
division, smaller crowds and barely a whiff of the pennant race, and 
be assured of meeting their reduced expenses.  The first option could 
bring them a nice profit or, if things went south, a mountain of debt 
that might require them to sell their club and leave the ownership 
fraternity they prized above all else.  The second option virtually 
guaranteed perpetual membership in the fraternity regardless of how 
their club finished in the standings.  Given the choice, it was no 
wonder so many of them took the latter route.93 
Competitive self-interest (as opposed to self-promotion and status) 
was not much of a concern to these pre-expansion owners because, 
unless they did something foolhardy such as expend precious 
resources toward putting a competitive team on the field, their ledgers 
would be balanced by factors that had little to do with the play of their 
team on the diamond.94  Given the meager expenses in the game at 
the time, it did not take much in the way of attendance for a club to 
break even at the end of the year regardless of how it finished in the 
pennant race.  A club could average as few as 1500 fans a game 
during the week and still break even because it would receive the 
income necessary to pay its bills in the few games (night games, 
Sunday games, games against the Yankees in the American League or 
whomever happened to be ruling the National League at the time) 
annually that drew large crowds.  For decades, a club could draw as 
few as 500,000 fans a season—with the majority of these fans 
showing up only for the few premium games during the season—and 
still remain comfortably in business.95  In this atmosphere, it was not 
uncommon for owners and general managers to consult each other on 
salaries, player movement, and other internal decisions.96  
Maintaining a competitive advantage was not something that was 
always in the forefront of their minds. 
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Rather than fight the system (i.e., the Yankees—the most powerful 
and visible team within Major League Baseball) and sweat, most 
American League owners found it more advantageous to give in to it, 
to take orders from the Yankees, and to make sure that their votes 
aligned with the Yankees’ interests.  In return, the Yankees subsidized 
their seven putative competitors.97  The Yankees’ tally between 1921 
and 1964 is a testament to this devotion: twenty-nine pennants and 
twenty World Series championship rings in that forty-three-year span.  
Even in the National League, the Yankees held influence; it was their 
“brand” that the other teams fed off (not to mention the fact that the 
Yankees were often willing trade partners for teams looking to dump 
high-salaried players in order to balance their ledger sheets at the end 
of another disappointing season).  The aura of the Yankees of Ruth, 
Gehrig, and DiMaggio spilled over into every Major League city.  In 
this atmosphere, cohesiveness was not hard to achieve.  Thus, it was 
mutual weakness that necessitated the codependence that drove these 
old-guard owners into each other’s arms.  In the process, they were 
able to clearly and forcefully speak on behalf of “baseball.”  They had 
a unified vision as well as the ability to see it through. 
The old-time owners were exemplified in the two-headed beast that 
ran the Yankees for much of their golden age: Dan Topping and Del 
Webb.  Topping was considered the “sportsman” of the pair, not 
unlike Bob Carpenter of the Phillies and Tom Yawkey of the Red 
Sox.  Although he dabbled in business, he was independently wealthy 
and effectively an amateur aristocrat.98  With this background, he 
answered to no one.  His money was his own; he was privileged to 
spend it as he pleased.  Webb, on the other hand, was a businessman 
through and through.  By the early sixties, one would not be incorrect 
in calling him a mogul—his construction empire spread across the 
nation and was involved in hotels, casinos, and ballparks, along with 
military contracts.99  However, his was a typical prewar corporation 
in that, despite its size, it was organized very simply.  Given that his 
corporation was essentially involved in only a single line of 
business—construction—Webb was able to maintain a strong, 
authoritarian voice.100  Like Topping, Webb was able to be a firm 
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decision maker.  The many businessmen owners, like Webb, operated 
as the heads of similarly organized, relatively simply constructed 
corporations focused on one or, at most, two lines of business.101  
Topping himself was the beneficiary of this simple, streamlined 
organizational structure; his grandfather, Daniel Reid, was known as 
“The Tin plate King,” having amassed his fortune in the tin 
industry.102  Even those owners whose resumes were broader than 
either Webb’s or Topping’s typically stuck to a straightforward, 
relatively simple business model.  Powel Crosley, owner of the Reds, 
was a little bit Topping and a little bit Webb; he was born into some 
money, but then he became an industrialist on his own.103  At times 
over the course of his professional career, he was involved in radio 
manufacturing and broadcasting, household appliance sales, and 
automobile production, along with his interest in the Reds.104  
However, one would hardly call Crosley’s empire a conglomerate, or 
even an empire for that matter.  Rather, it would be more accurate to 
say that he dabbled in a little of this and a little of that over the course 
of his life.  And in all of it, his was the final word. 
This business model would undergo a radical transformation 
beginning in the middle of the twentieth century but picking up steam 
by the sixties such that, by the seventies, and certainly by the eighties, 
such autonomy by any one individual would be practically unheard 
of.  This rendered it near impossible for any one owner to make firm 
decisions on the spot without fear of the ramifications beyond the 
owners’ caucus; there were simply too many other interests to 
consider.  This diminution of authority in the individual could have no 
other effect but to fray group cohesiveness as well as the ability of the 
owners to speak with a unified voice.  In the process, their role of 
guardians of the concept of baseball diminished. 
The destruction of the small, single-industry corporation through 
the concentration of economic power would be the outstanding 
feature of the post–World War II American economy.105  During the 
fifties, this concentration accelerated such that quickly a dwindling 
percentage of American corporations accounted for an increasingly 
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overwhelming share of net corporate income.  The transformation of 
America from a land of many simple, single-industry corporations—
family businesses—to one of relatively few mega-conglomerates that 
were dispersed across multiple lines of business was swift and 
staggering.  “By the end of the 1960s, the 100 largest industrial 
corporations held a greater share of total assets than the 200 largest in 
1950, and the largest 200 held about the same share as the largest 
1000 did in 1941.”106  The result of this flurry of activity was 
obvious: between 1955 and 1970, the largest companies––the 
“Fortune 500”—practically doubled in profits and assets.107  As for 
how this came about, the answer was simple: mergers and 
acquisitions.  In the two decades following the conclusion of World 
War II, 3900 smaller companies were swallowed up by the 200 
largest companies such that, by the late sixties, almost all large 
manufacturers were operating in more than five separate industries.108  
Smaller single-industry companies, the mom-and-pop shops that 
formed the backbone of the American economy in the early part of 
the century and the ones that bred many Major League Baseball 
owners during this period, were gobbled up by increasingly larger, 
more diverse conglomerates with complicated corporate structures 
and large boards of directors replete with divergent and often 
conflicting interests.109 
This transformation would profoundly change the nature of 
American business and, therefore, the management side of Major 
League Baseball.  Decision making now was a much more 
complicated process.  There were multiple interests to consider, many 
of them competing with one another.  As this new corporate influence 
seeped into baseball during the sixties, the days of sitting across the 
table from a fellow owner and making major decisions on the spot 
were dwindling.  To be sure, there were several members of the old-
guard left: the O’Malleys, the Carpenters, the Yawkeys.  But over 
time they came to be outnumbered by the products of the revolution 
until they were little more than relics of an earlier, simpler time—
plantation owners in the land of the corporate boardroom.  When they 
finally departed, the old days were gone for good. 
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Most Americans were either unaware of or indifferent to the 
corporate revolution going on all around them, which was changing 
the fundamental realities of their daily lives.  Media attention was 
focused elsewhere: Vietnam, the Cold War, the hippies in San 
Francisco, and the sit-ins in Berkeley.110  In baseball, attention was 
similarly diverted to an issue that was easier to cover, easier to paint 
in black and white: Marvin Miller and his suddenly agitated Players 
Association.  All of these uprisings were significant, sometimes 
colossal in their impact, but the corporate revolution affected them all 
in a quiet yet profound way: this revolution affected the decision-
making process with regard to all of the others.  And how a response 
is made often dictates the response itself. 
Corporate ownership and corporate influence were not foreign 
concepts to Major League Baseball prior to the sixties but, as the 
decades wore on, it would see more and more of them.  As new 
owners arrived on the scene of the newly expanded National and 
American Leagues (with four teams being added in 1961 and 1962), 
they would be, in one sense, far more powerful people than their 
predecessors; they were in most cases far richer and far more 
influential politically given the realities of running a multinational 
conglomerate (it is far easier to get the collective ear of Congress 
when your business operates in all fifty states rather than in one or 
two).111  But it would be their individual power that would bring the 
owners down collectively; having to answer to so many interests other 
than their baseball brethren simply made group cohesiveness 
impossible. 
The corporate influx in Major League Baseball grew more 
pronounced as the decades passed.  Eventually, huge conglomerates 
such as Disney, Time Warner, the Tribune Company, and others 
owned controlling interests in ball clubs.112  All of these investors had 
varied agendas, some baseball related, some not.  Although the 
transition from plantation to boardroom ownership was complete by 
the nineties, the new wave began disrupting and fraying the old guard 
from the moment it arrived several decades earlier.113  With all of the 
varied interests now present at the owners’ table, the ability of a 
powerful team such as the Yankees, to say nothing of the 
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commissioner himself, to dictate an agenda or to speak on behalf of 
others, or for “baseball” for that matter, became increasingly difficult.  
How to persuade a conglomerate?  There were simply too many 
disparate private agendas involved as more and more clubs now had 
their own large, institutional problems to consider.114  Everyone was 
seemingly out for themselves with nobody left to look out for or to 
speak on behalf of our national pastime. 
Starting in the sixties, the economics of baseball changed; clubs 
were no longer the financial equivalent of supermarkets.  The 
corporate revolution amped up the American economy and made 
everything bigger and more expensive, including Major League 
Baseball clubs.  Significant debt service now became an issue: clubs 
needed to consider it whenever making significant decisions.115  No 
longer could they simply fall blindly in line behind the Yankees; they 
had their creditors and shareholders to consider.  Big money meant 
the arrival of big, powerful people and entities in the game, but people 
and entities with agendas that rarely considered the well-being of their 
putative competitors.  The old guard always considered themselves a 
powerful lot, but the source of their collective power was rooted in 
weakness rather than strength.  When the individually powerful 
products of the corporate revolution infiltrated the ranks of club 
ownership, the result was not enhanced power and prestige but, 
ironically, a dissipation of it.  Their tight fraternity was finally 
cracked and, once it was, the old guard’s solidarity was irrevocably 
broken.  They could no longer speak with one voice.  Gone was their 
ability to speak for the concept of “baseball” and the deference that 
came with that. 
As the longtime stalwarts left the game, they were replaced with 
owners from the corporate boardroom who were more likely than 
their predecessors to enter and leave the scene quickly, seeking profit 
and then exiting either as soon as they had achieved it or found that it 
was not forthcoming in sufficient abundance.  By 1963, either through 
expansion or recent transfers in ownership, six of ten American 
League owners were individuals who were not members of the 
fraternity a mere three years earlier (in the National League it was 
four out of ten).116  Thus, at joint league meetings, half of the 
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decision makers were people new to one another.  This dynamic 
added to the increasing difficulty of maintaining group cohesiveness. 
The changes and turnover in ownership increased throughout the 
next several years.  In 1969, another round of expansion brought four 
more teams and, therefore, four new faces to the table along with new 
owners in Cincinnati and Washington.117  By the seventies, club 
owners were coming and going at an unprecedented rate.  As stated 
earlier, though there had always been some turnover in ranks, 
ownership turnover was nothing like it was after the influx of the 
products of the corporate revolution.  Something fundamentally 
changed in the nature of club owners; they simply were not staying in 
the game as long as they had before.  Although the irony was most 
likely lost on most of the ownership group as it existed during the mid 
to late seventies, despite their charges of renegade behavior leveled at 
the players as a result of free agency, it was the owners who were 
carpetbagging like never before.  All of this had disastrous results for 
their once tight fraternity; in this atmosphere it was almost impossible 
for one owner to get to know another.  Before long, they would be 
replaced with somebody else.  Without fraternal allegiances 
everybody was out for themselves.  Concepts such as vision and 
cohesiveness were things of the past.  Without an institutional 
memory, owners meetings became pitched battles between self-
serving owners interested only in what benefited them today; 
yesterday or tomorrow be damned.118  Major League Baseball 
ownership had always been portrayed as a collection of separate 
fiefdoms, but for decades, the power of and deference to the Yankees 
made a mockery of this allegation.  After the corporate revolution, it 
was a mockery no more. 
V 
THE NATIONAL DEMONIZATION OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL AND 
THE SEPARATION OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL FROM THE CONCEPT 
OF BASEBALL 
The shift in power within the game from the owners to the players 
did not result in a concurrent passing of the torch in terms of the role 
of spokesmen and protectors of the concept of baseball.  While the 
owners faded into the background, the players, through their powerful 
Players Association, were never able to replace them as the voice of 
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the game.  With repeated labor showdowns throughout the seventies 
and eighties, culminating in the 1994–95 strike that wiped out the 
1994 World Series, public mistrust of the Players Association grew 
only more fervent.  As such, because they were repeatedly vilified by 
the owners, the media, and consequently, the public, the players were 
unable to successfully become the voice for anything beyond their 
own self-interests.  Eventually, it became fashionable to draw a line 
between Major League Baseball as composed of the increasingly 
anonymous owners and demonized Players Association on one side 
and the purer, perhaps fictional, certainly larger, concept of baseball 
on the other.  In the process, Major League Baseball, and all who 
resided within it, became divorced from the idea of baseball as our 
national pastime.  Inherent in this separation was the notion that the 
Major Leagues comprised only one aspect, and a less significant one 
at that, of the larger concept of baseball.  By the time of the C.B.C. 
decisions, Major League Baseball (as well as the Players Association 
who partnered with it through Major League Baseball Advanced 
Media) spoke only for itself and not more expansively for the game 
overall.  All of this left the C.B.C. courts with the question of how to 
determine what was in the best interest of our national game.  Who 
was to decide?  In a break with the past, the courts concluded that, 
this time, they were the best qualified entity to speak on the game’s 
behalf. 
In their increasingly feverish battles with the Players Association, 
the owners set out to demonize its leader, Marvin Miller.  This tactic 
proved unsuccessful as the Players Association steamrolled over the 
weakened owners’ cabal in showdown after showdown.  On a grander 
scale, however, this tactic did inflict lasting damage; the portrait of 
Miller and the Players Association that the owners helped to create 
(and which Miller oftentimes did little to counteract) would assure 
that, regardless of their power and sway within Major League 
Baseball, the Players Association would never be regarded as the 
stewards of the game the way the owners once were. 
Whenever provided the opportunity, the owners, either through 
their mouthpiece, Commissioner Bowie Kuhn, or directly, would call 
into question Miller’s patriotism.  At one point, Kuhn stated that he 
believed Miller to harbor “a deep hatred and suspicion of the 
American right and of American capitalism.”119  Sportswriters across 
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the nation hammered away at the patriotism charge as well, labeling 
the leader of the Players Association “Comrade Miller,” or “Marvin 
Millerinski.”120  Beyond the snarky, communist-baiting monikers, 
critics disparaged Miller for having a “narrow mind” and in many 
ways they were correct; Miller refused to do what the owners had 
done for decades: to mythologize and romanticize the game and to 
make it a metaphor of idyllic American ideals.  He refused to block 
out the negative and focus only on an idealized positive.  He refused 
to use the rhetoric associated with the concept of baseball to justify 
the fundamental inequalities and subjugation that existed within 
Major League Baseball.121 
Quite simply, he had no interest in the larger concept of baseball.  
Instead, he was focused solely on the labor issues that confronted his 
clients, and he considered it his job to address them.  In the process, 
he perhaps unwittingly drew a distinctly different portrait of both 
baseball and America than the portraits most Americans had grown 
up with through the owners’ blather with regard to the idyllic life of a 
Major League Baseball player.  In Miller’s world, the game, as well 
as life, was cold, harsh, and unforgiving.  Although, unlike the 
owners, he rarely encouraged the connection between baseball and 
America; it was inevitable, however, that the public would make one, 
given that the relationship between the two had been forged through 
nearly a century of association by the owners as well as the media.  
As such, and with the encouragement of Kuhn and the owners, 
Miller’s take on baseball’s labor issues was received by a public who 
saw it as a critique on a grander scale—a virulently un-American 
perspective offered up by one whose patriotic allegiances were 
questionable.  All of this doomed Miller and the Players Association 
in the court of public opinion, regardless of his strategic successes 
vis-à-vis the owners.  Even if they could prevail at the bargaining 
table (as they overwhelmingly did), there would be little chance of 
their assuming the mantle of guardians of the game.  For there was 
little chance that the well-being of our national pastime would be 
entrusted to an entity headed by an alleged communist sympathizer. 
The divergent portraits of baseball, historically drawn by the 
owners and more recently by Miller, were never more clearly on 
display than in the Supreme Court’s 1972 opinion in Flood v. 
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Kuhn.122  In that case, the Justices were required not merely to 
resolve the legal dispute surrounding Curt Flood’s quest for free 
agency but also to announce their preferred vision of the game: the 
romantic one offered by the owners or the brutal slave narrative 
propounded by Miller.  If they chose the owners’ vision, deference to 
the benevolent protectors of the game and consistency with historical 
precedent would be an acceptable result.  If they chose Miller’s 
vision, a ruling placing the fate of players such as Flood in the hands 
of the self-serving manor lords could only be absurd.  In the end, the 
majority sided with the owners, choosing romance over reality.  As 
such, even though the Court retreated from its position in Federal 
Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional 
Baseball Clubs123 (the case that created the exemption in 1922 by 
holding that Major League Baseball was not engaged in interstate 
commerce), it held that ultimately this fundamental shift in 
perspective was not dispositive.  Instead, it held that the Sherman Act 
was nevertheless inapplicable to Major League Baseball, concluding 
simply that its decisions in Federal Baseball and later in Toolson v. 
New York Yankees, Inc.124 were “aberration[s] confined to 
baseball.”125  In Justice Harry Blackmun’s majority opinion, he 
identified himself as firmly in the camp of the romantics as he 
prefaced his opinion with a five-paragraph summary of his 
understanding of the history of the game, the greats who played it, 
and the Americana that surrounds it, ticking off the writing of Ring 
Lardner, Thayer’s “Casey at the Bat,” and “the ring of Tinker to Evers 
to Chance.”126  All of this, concluded Blackmun, “made it the 
‘national pastime’ or, depending upon the point of view, ‘the great 
American tragedy.’”127  Once he finally reached the merits of the 
case, Blackmun again diverged into romance and mythology, quoting 
approvingly from the lower court’s ruling against Flood: 
 Baseball has been the national pastime for over one hundred 
years and enjoys a unique place in our American heritage.  Major 
league professional baseball is avidly followed by millions of fans, 
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looked upon with fervor and pride and provides a special source of 
inspiration an competitive team spirit especially for the young. 
 Baseball’s status in the life of the nation is so pervasive that it 
would not strain credulity to say the Court can take judicial notice 
that baseball is everybody’s business.  To put it mildly and with 
restraint, it would be unfortunate indeed if a fine sport and 
profession, which brings surcease from daily travail and an escape 
from the ordinary to most inhabitants of this land, were to suffer in 
the least because of undue concentration by any one or any group 
on commercial and profit considerations.  The game is on higher 
ground; it behooves everyone to keep it there.128 
Consistent with the romantic view of Major League Baseball, only 
players such as Flood could be accused of “undue concentration . . . 
on commercial and profit considerations.”  Because the owners were 
benevolent guardians of the national game, they necessarily had 
higher considerations and priorities. 
In dissent, Justice William O. Douglas adopted Miller’s worldview 
and, in so doing, focused on the absurdity of entrusting the owners 
with overseeing the public interest in baseball.  In a direct rebuke of 
Blackmun and the romantics, Douglas remarked that the Federal 
Baseball decision was “a derelict in the stream of the law that we, its 
creator, should remove.  Only a romantic view of a rather dismal 
business account over the last 50 years would keep that derelict in 
midstream.”129  Taking note of the modern realities of Major League 
Baseball (those realities ignored by the owners and hammered upon 
time and again by Miller), Justice Douglas wrote: 
 Baseball is today big business that is packaged with beer, with 
broadcasting, and with other industries.  The beneficiaries of the 
Federal Baseball Club decision are not the Babe Ruths, Ty Cobbs, 
and Lou Gehrigs. 
 The owners, whose records many say reveal a proclivity for 
predatory practices, do not come to us with equities.  The equities 
are with the victims of the reserve clause.  I use the word “victims” 
in the Sherman Act sense, since a contract which forbids anyone to 
practice his calling is commonly called an unreasonable restraint of 
trade.130 
Justice Douglas’s perspective would receive a measure of vindication 
thirty-five years later in the C.B.C. decision when the Eighth Circuit 
balanced the competing interests and held that, contrary to Justice 
Blackmun’s pronouncement, the public interest was contrary to, not 
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inherent within, that of the owners.  In essence, it held that the 
proprietors of the “dismal business” of baseball were incapable of 
looking beyond their personal pecuniary interests and acting in 
furtherance of the larger concept of baseball.  The C.B.C. decision 
would go even further, however, in that it did not merely hold against 
the owners; it held against the Players Association as well.  That it 
did, as well as the fact that the owners and the Players Association 
were on the same side of the issue in this case, speaks volumes on 
how the image of Major League Baseball changed in the thirty-five 
years between the Flood and C.B.C. decisions. 
With each victory over the owners, the Players Association gained 
just a bit more stature within Major League Baseball.  Within a 
remarkably short time, the players rose from inconsequential serfs to 
de facto partners with the owners in the running of the game.  
Although they were formally paired in ventures such as Major League 
Baseball Advanced Media, they were informally linked in a myriad of 
other ways as each successive collective bargaining agreement 
granted them an increasingly greater say over the business side of 
baseball.  By the nineties, “Major League Baseball” no longer implied 
merely the collection of owners along with the commissioner.  Now, 
with the owners fading into the background (indeed, by this point 
most owners were unrecognizable even in their own cities—a far cry 
from the days of O’Malley, Yawkey, and Wrigley, et al.), the term 
“Major League Baseball,” at least in a business sense, implied the 
uneasy partnership between management and the Players Association.  
And because the labor waters had been so unsettled ever since the 
arrival of Marvin Miller and his emboldened union, many casual fans 
(along with many more hardcore fans) blamed the Players 
Association for the seemingly endless threatened work stoppages 
between 1972 (when the players first walked out in spring training, 
which resulted in the shortening of the 1972 season) and 1994 (when 
baseball Armageddon arrived in the form of a canceled World Series).  
Led at first by the putative communist Miller, and later by the no less 
reviled Donald Fehr, there was little chance that the newly formed 
partnership at the helm of Major League Baseball would be able to 
speak persuasively on behalf of the larger concept of baseball.  As a 
result, public respect and deference to the better judgment of the 
leaders of the modern game would most likely be less forthcoming 
than it had been in the game’s master-servant plantation era.  
Ultimately, Marvin Miller achieved what he set out to do back when 
he assumed the position of executive director of the Players 
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Association back in 1966; the era of benevolent paternalism was over.  
But with its passing went Major League Baseball’s authoritative voice 
as well. 
Although it would be too simplistic to denote a single date or event 
as the turning point in Major League Baseball’s public stature, the 
1994–95 strike is relevant in that it perhaps represented the 
culmination of over two decades of events that conspired to bring 
about the change.  As the stoppage wore on (it eventually lingered 
into 1995 and shortened that season as well), many fans struggled to 
reconcile their reverence for the concept of baseball with their distaste 
for the labor wars affecting Major League Baseball.  In the process, 
some (although certainly not all) divorced the two, altering their 
definition of baseball itself.  Whereas for generations the game (along 
with the concept) was defined through Major League players such as 
Babe Ruth, Mickey Mantle, Willie Mays, Jackie Robinson, and 
Roberto Clemente, with “baseball” and “Major League Baseball” 
being synonymous, now, to an increasingly broader swath of fans, 
“baseball” was something else altogether, something distinct and 
severed from its professional incarnation.  As Robert Lipsyte wrote 
on the day after the season was canceled (in sentiments that were 
repeated, in some variation, by columnists, sportscasters, and fans 
across the nation): 
Baseball has less to do than one might think with the major league 
season.  Baseball is about the family farm, which few of us grew up 
on, and it is about railroad trains keening in the night on the 
prairies, which few of us have ever heard.  It is about daydreaming 
of drinking the same beer with your dad as he drank with his dad, of 
screaming at your son’s Little League coach in the same obnoxious 
way your father screamed at your coach.131 
To Lipsyte, the mythical (as he clearly acknowledged it to be) concept 
of baseball was independent of its Major League incarnation.  The 
1994 Major League strike was irrelevant to it; it survived because the 
concept of baseball and Major League Baseball were two distinct 
entities.  The former demanded the respect and reverence it always 
had; the latter had apparently used up its chits.  The Eighth Circuit 
would make clear what Lipsyte and many fans voiced out of 
frustration over the cancellation of the 1994 World Series; Major 
League Baseball and the concept of baseball were inexorably 
intertwined no more. 
 
131 Robert Lipsyte, In Memoriam, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1994, at A1. 
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It is important to note that the Eighth Circuit’s decision need not 
have come out the way it did; if the court had been so inclined, it 
could have both protected the concept of baseball and deferred to 
Major League Baseball in an opinion that would have been no 
different from the myriad of other baseball cases that had come before 
federal courts from the Federal Baseball decision forward.  That it 
chose to protect the concept and to rule against Major League 
Baseball marks it as somewhat of a departure from its forebears and 
perhaps signals a shift in the federal judiciary’s attitude toward Major 
League Baseball, if not the concept of baseball itself.  For instance, in 
the court’s balancing of interests (between the players’ acknowledged 
rights of publicity and the First Amendment), it emitted a hint of 
judicial cynicism toward the alliance between the owners and the 
Players Association.  Despite the acknowledged rights of publicity, 
the court held that this was nevertheless not the sort of case that calls 
for judicial protection of these rights.132  “Economic interests that 
states seek to promote include the right of an individual to reap the 
rewards of his or her endeavors” the court stated.133  Although it 
would seem as if protecting a player’s right to benefit from the 
commercial use of his name by way of fantasy baseball falls squarely 
within this definition, the court brushed this argument aside, stating 
coolly that “major league baseball players are rewarded, and 
handsomely, too, for their participation in games and can earn 
additional large sums from endorsements and sponsorship 
arrangements.”134  Perceived self-interest and greed seems to have 
worked against the Players Association here, as the Eighth Circuit 
appears to have made its own calculation that the players earned 
enough money in other ways to make the infringement of their rights 
of publicity in this instance to be inconsequential.  It is difficult to 
reconcile the court’s definition of the proper use of the right of 
publicity with its subsequent application of the facts in this case 
unless one factors in the possibility that the court simply was adamant 
about not providing a judicial blessing upon yet another means for 
growing the coffers of the self-interested Players Association. 
 
132 See C.B.C. Distrib. & Mtkg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, LP, 
505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007) (“In addition, the facts in this case barely, if at all, 
implicate the interests that states typically intend to vindicate by providing rights of 
publicity to individuals.”). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
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In addition, through its adoption of the “public domain” rationale 
for permitting the First Amendment to outweigh the players’ rights of 
publicity, the court likewise demonstrated little of the deference 
courts have traditionally shown toward Major League Baseball 
(perhaps because “Major League Baseball” now included the Players 
Association as well).  As stated earlier, the court held that “it would 
be strange law that a person would not have a first amendment right 
to use information that is available to everyone.”135  However, as 
other commentators have noted, the public domain rationale falls 
short in that the people most likely to seek protection under the right 
of publicity are celebrities of one ilk or another and these are 
precisely the people “most likely to be in the ‘public domain’ due to 
their fame.”136  “The very people that the right of publicity exists to 
protect are those who likely have information about them in the 
‘public domain,’ and it is not ‘strange law’ to allow these people to be 
protected, considering that this is the purpose of the right of 
publicity.”137  Through the court’s curious reasoning, practically 
every right of publicity case would be trumped by the First 
Amendment due merely to the realities of the individuals seeking 
protection under the doctrine.  “Taken to its logical end, this would 
mean that the use of a person’s picture for commercial advantage 
would be trumped by the First Amendment simply because the 
information is readily available in the ‘public domain.’”138  This 
calculation makes a mockery of the right of publicity, which, in the 
players’ case here, was extraordinarily compelling given the amount 
of money generated through the use of their names for the purpose of 
commercial fantasy baseball games.  That the court blithely dismissed 
the players’ compelling interests may in be due, at least in part, once 
again to the court’s unwillingness to sanction this additional stream of 
revenue to the seemingly greedy, self-interested players. 
Irrespective of the court’s disdain for Major League Baseball, its 
reverence for the concept of “baseball” was undiminished, a reality 
made clear in the court’s framing of the First Amendment interests 
presented in the case.  Rather than view the merits of this fantasy 
baseball case through the narrow prism of the “dismal business” of 
baseball as advocated by Justice Douglas in his Flood dissent 
 
135 Id. at 823. 
136 Mann, supra note 10, at 316. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 317. 
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(although it certainly did not hesitate to see the interests of the Players 
Association through this prism), the court chose to view the issue 
more expansively and, as most courts had done previously, held that 
the public interest lay not merely within the commercial endeavor of 
fantasy baseball games (which would presumably be insignificant) 
but instead with “information about the game of baseball and its 
players.”139  Through this framework, the public interest was strong 
indeed given that what was at stake was information vital to the 
nation’s ability to properly follow its national pastime.140  Just as 
courts had done for decades, the Eighth Circuit was unable to see the 
issue before it for what it was: a simple business dispute between 
competing private interests.  Instead, it saw narrow, self-serving 
interests on one side (i.e., a dismal business) and a broad, patriotic 
public interest on the other.  Had MLB AM attempted to prevent the 
publication of players’ statistics in newspapers or more generally over 
the Internet, the Eighth Circuit’s definition of the interests in this case 
would have been closer to the mark; in those scenarios the national 
interest in “information about the game of baseball” would have been 
compromised indeed.  Here, however, MLB AM’s purpose was 
limited in scope to protecting the substantial rights of publicity of its 
players against infringement by a company that intended to reap 
significant profits through a violation of these rights; the public’s 
ability to otherwise obtain this information remained unobstructed.  
As such, there was no national public interest at issue in this case; the 
interests on both sides were purely commercial.  The First 
Amendment interest was insignificant at best, if it existed at all. 
CONCLUSION 
By traveling down the road of its predecessors in focusing on (and 
deferring to) the concept of “baseball” rather than on the specifics of 
the commercial dispute that was more properly before it, the Eighth 
Circuit distorted the true issue presented in the C.B.C. Distribution 
litigation and transformed it into yet another case that seemingly 
called for the protection of our national game.  As such, the ruling 
was going to be, as was inevitable, one that yet again protected and 
promoted “baseball” rather than one that addressed the specific 
concerns before the court.  It was only upon examining the competing 
 
139 See C.B.C. Distribution, 503 F.3d at 823.  The court followed this with its paean to 
the game discussed earlier. 
140 Id. at 823–24. 
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interests before it that the Eighth Circuit departed from its 
predecessors; the court saw the alliance between the owners and the 
Players Association as self-interested.  Seemingly because it saw 
greed on this side of the equation, it ruled against Major League 
Baseball rather than for it, something that would have been difficult to 
imagine back in “the good old days” when Major League Baseball 
was run by a cartel of well-known and well-respected owners who 
spoke with a unified voice, purportedly on behalf of the concept of 
baseball and not merely themselves.  Back then, it most likely would 
have considered a ruling for the owners to be consistent with a ruling 
that protected and promoted the larger concept of baseball.  If fantasy 
baseball had existed,141 the court most likely would have entrusted 
the industry of fantasy baseball to these seemingly benevolent 
owners, holding that, because they had the public interest at heart, 
they would be better able to decide how to manage it to ensure that 
the national interest in both the game on the field, as well as the 
fantasy variation of it, would be protected and furthered.  Instead, due 
to changes within the game, as well as larger societal shifts over the 
past half century, the court took the protection and promotion of the 
concept of baseball upon itself and substituted its own judgment for 
that of Major League Baseball.  It will be interesting to see just how 
many other federal courts will do the same going forward. 
 
141 In fact, fantasy baseball, in one form or another, has been around for decades.  Jack 
Kerouac played a rudimentary version of it as early as 1933.  By 1938 he had developed a 
game that would be recognizable to modern fantasy baseball players in that he developed 
his own team names (he was fond of names based on automobiles, hence the “Boston 
Fords,” “St. Louis LaSalles,” etc.).  He liked to imagine himself as a fantasy general 
manager and proposed “trades” for the purpose of stocking his own “fantasy team.”  See 
ISAAC GEWIRTZ, KEROUAC AT BAT: FANTASY SPORTS AND THE KING OF THE BEATS 31–
39 (2009).  In 1960, the modern fantasy baseball game was born when sociologist William 
Gamson introduced his creation to a few of his colleagues at the Harvard School of Public 
Health.  He called it the “Baseball Seminar” and explained that participants were to act as 
if they were general managers, bidding on the rights to actual Major League players in an 
auction and then playing games using these players’ actual game statistics.  See “Baseball 
Seminar”: The First Fantasy Game?, in LATE INNINGS, supra note 67, 256, 256–58.  In 
1980, an outgrowth of the Baseball Seminar was created by writer and editor Daniel 
Okrent and friends at La Rotisserie Français restaurant in New York. They called it 
“Rotisserie League Baseball” which eventually became known more generally as “fantasy 
baseball.”  See id. at 256; see also PAST TIME, supra note 9, at 199–200. 
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